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The election of an Australian Labor Government in Australia in 2007 saw ‘social inclusion’ 
emerge as the official and overarching social policy agenda. Being ‘included’ was subsequently 
defined by the ALP Government as being able to ‘have the resources, opportunities and 
capabilities needed to learn, work, engage and have a voice’. Various researchers in Australia 
demonstrated an interest in social inclusion, as it enabled them to construct a multi-dimensional 
framework for measuring disadvantage. This research program resulted in various forms of 
statistical modelling based on some agreement about what it means to be included in society. 
The multi-dimensional approach taken by academic researchers, however, did not necessarily 
translate to a new model of social policy development or implementation. We argue that, similar 
to the experience of the UK, Australia’s social inclusion policy agenda was for the most part 
narrowly and individually defined by politicians and policy makers, particularly in terms of 
equating being employed with being included. We conclude with discussion about the need to 
strengthen the social inclusion framework by adopting an understanding of social inequality and 
social justice that is more relational and less categorical.   





























































































































































































































































































































































































































Strengthening the discourse of social inclusion-exclusion 
To	get	beyond	a	‘weak	discourse’	version	of	social	inclusion	we	want	to	suggest	that		
governments	might	do	well	to	revisit	and	refurbish	some	of	their	guiding	social	policy	principles	
from	the	twentieth	century,	such	as	social	citizenship	and	social	justice.	Here,	we	propose	an	
approach	that	captures	the	relational	and	stratified	nature	of	divisions	within	society	by	
acknowledging	the	relations	of	power	that	underlie	the	divisions	between	social	groups.	A	broad	
account	of	social	welfare	and	social	justice,	such	as	that	advocated	by	Titmuss	(1958),	Townsend	
(1979),	and	Jamrozik	(2005),	point	to	general	trends	in	society	and	the	distribution	of	
advantage	and	disadvantage,	while	also	signalling	the	influence	of	power	and	dominant	
interests.	In	this	sense	we	want	to	marry	a	revitalised	conception	of	social	citizenship	with	a	
relational	view	of	power	relations	within	society	in	order	to	strengthen	approaches	to	
conceptualising	inclusion‐exclusion.	
T.H.	Marshall	(1950)	is	the	usual	starting	point	for	discussing	citizenship	rights.	He	theorises	
citizenship	as	comprising	three	stages	of	broad	historical	evolution	towards	civil,	political	and	
social	rights.	Civil	citizenship,	from	the	eighteenth	century	onwards,	is	the	right	to	personal	
freedom	in	the	form	of	speech,	movement,	and	assembly.	Political	citizenship,	emerging	in	the	
nineteenth	century,	is	the	right	to	vote	and	stand	for	public	office.	Social	citizenship,	a	creation	
of	the	twentieth	century,	includes	economic	security	and	equal	access	to	health,	education	and	
employment	opportunities	(Marshall	1950).	Citizenship	is	closely	tied	to	the	enjoyment	of	rights	
and	may	be	understood	at	a	quintessential	level	as	‘the	right	to	have	rights’	(McNeely	1998:	9).	
In	this	sense,	Marshall’s	treatment	of	citizenship	refers	to	a	complex,	multi‐layered	entity	that	
traverses	legally	based	rights	and	obligations	and	also	‘natural’	or	human	rights.	This	is	
particularly	the	case	for	social	citizenship,	with	its	aspirations	for	participation,	greater	social	
equality	and	access	to	the	benefits	of	health	and	education.	Civil	and	political	rights	to	due	legal	
process	and	to	vote	are	written	into	established	law,	conferring	citizenship	with	legal	status	
(McNeely	1998),	and	are	capable	of	recognition	and	definition	‘with	some	precision’	(Heater	
2004:	114–115).		
Social	citizenship	as	considered	by	Marshall,	connects	closely	with	the	United	Nations	Human	
Rights	enactments	of	the	1940s,	contemporaneous	with	and	helping	to	shape	the	background	to	
when	he	was	writing	Citizenship	and	Social	Class	(Heater	2004).	Social	citizenship	may	be	
understood	as:		
The	whole	range	from	a	right	to	a	modicum	of	economic	welfare	and	security,	to	
the	right	to	share	to	the	full	in	the	social	heritage	and	to	live	the	life	of	a	civilized	
being,	according	to	the	standards	prevailing	in	a	civilized	society	(Marshall	1950:	
12).	
Social	citizenship	is	also	about	human	dignity,	guaranteed	by	the	welfare	state	to	ensure	that	
individuals	have	the	material	wherewithal	to	take	part	in	society.	The	centrality	of	a	state	
guarantee	of	adequate	resources	is	key	to	being	human	(Kincaid	1973).	This	perception	of	
humanity	is	linked	to	concepts	of	liberty	and	freedom	that	have	been	refined	in	the	twenty‐first	
century,	notably	in	the	work	of	Sen	(1981;	2000;	2006),	Standing	(2001;	2002;	2011)	and	Weil	
(1988).	Personal	development	and	liberty	are	interrelated	in	a	complex	way	around	the	
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concepts	of	capabilities	and	functioning.	The	central	issue	is	that	of	personal	freedom	to	realise	
fully	one’s	human	capacities.	A	well	enforced	‘structure	of	rights’	affords	each	person	the	
greatest	possible	opportunity	to	do	whatever	she	might	want	to	do	(Sen	1981:	45).		
For	Standing	(2001:	30),	real	freedom	‘requires	a	system	of	social	protection	that	allows	people	
of	all	backgrounds	to	be	able	to	make	choices’.	It	might	also	be	said	that	‘real’	choices	can	only	be	
made	when	essential	resources	are	available	to	all.	Marshall’s	trilogy	of	citizenship	categories	is	
extended	by	Standing	in	arguing	for	a	definition	of	work	far	removed	from	the	narrow	confines	
of	paid	employment,	or	the	strictures	of	welfare‐to‐work	schemes	as	gateways	to	social	security	
benefits.	Instead,	in	capturing	the	notion	of	human	potential	implicit	in	Marshall’s	social	
citizenship,	he	suggests	that	‘work	in	its	rich	sense	is	what	defines	the	human	being,	conveying	a	
restless,	creative,	reproductive	energy’,	termed	‘occupation’	(Standing	2001:	4).	
Here	then	is	a	fuller	version	of	citizenship	than	that	offered	by	the	‘industrial	citizenship’	of	
welfare‐to‐work	policies	and	the	associated	instrumental	approach	to	the	value	of	education	in	
human	capital	terms.	At	the	heart	of	these	earlier	approaches	to	citizenship	is	a	respect	for	
moral	adulthood,	autonomy	and	fairness	in	terms	of	the	distribution	of	national	goods	and	
resources,	and	an	acknowledgement	that	respectful	recognition	of	people’s	choices	and	
contributions	is	itself	a	matter	of	justice.	Devalued	social	identities	makes	denying	citizens	a	fair	
share	of	resources	politically	palatable	(Fraser	2010).	We	need	a	relational	approach	to	social	
justice	that	not	only	makes	the	connection	between	cultural	and	economic	justice	explicit,	but	
which	also	makes	the	connection	between	privilege	and	poverty	immediately	tangible,	rather	
than	‘natural’	and	acceptable.		
Recent	developments	in	political	philosophy	offer	a	model	of	social	justice	focused	on	seeing	
connections	between	privilege	and	poverty	in	a	way	that	seeks	to	uncover	structural	injustice	
and	implies	a	moral	imperative	that	justice	is	everyone’s	responsibility,	standing	in	stark	
contrast	to	a	liberal	discourse	of	self‐sufficiency,	productivity,	reward,	and	individual	blame.	Iris	
Marion	Young’s	(2011)	work	on	a	‘social	connection	model’	of	justice	is	one	such	example:	
The	social	connection	model	of	responsibility	says	that	individuals	bear	
responsibility	for	structural	justice	because	they	contribute	by	their	actions	to	the	
processes	that	produce	unjust	outcomes	(Marion	Young	2011:	103).	
From	this	perspective	it	is	disingenuous	to	suggest	that	persons	living	in	neighbourhoods	with	
poor	schools,	few	shops	and	dilapidated	housing,	miles	from	the	closest	job	opportunity	have	an	
equal	opportunity	with	other	persons	in	the	same	city.	From	a	‘social	connections	model’	of	
justice,	we	would	conclude	that	any	worry	about	irresponsibility	ought	to	be	directed	to	all	
citizens,	not	just	to	those	who	are	made	more	visible	by	state	surveillance.	We	might	also	
conclude	that	those	citizens	who	are	not	poor,	at	least	at	this	point	in	time,	participate	in	the	
same	structure	of	advantage	and	disadvantage,	constraint	and	enablement	as	those	who	fall	
below	the	poverty	line	at	some	point.	After	arriving	at	this	conclusion	it	becomes	that	much	
harder	to	absolve	ourselves	from	having	no	responsibility	for	social	injustice	(Young	2011).	This	
relational	approach	to	social	justice	also	acknowledges	that	the	line	between	vulnerable	and	
resilient	or	included	and	excluded	can	change	very	quickly,	particularly	in	times	of	personal	
illness,	acquired	disability,	or	widespread	global	economic	uncertainty.	In	short,	this	social	
connections	model	of	social	justice	would	resist	the	‘blame	welfare’	(Handler	&	Hasenfield	
2006)	discourse	that	is	dominant	in	countries	such	as	the	UK	and	Australia,	and	it	would	help	to	
promote	the	human	capability	to	see	‘the	them	in	us	and	the	us	in	them’	(Levitas	2005).		
We	do	not	have	the	space	to	articulate	the	multiple	implications	of	this	approach	for	policy	
implementation	and	human	service	delivery,	beyond	restating	the	importance	of	the	connection	
between	dominant	policy	frames	and	policy	action	and	the	importance	of	responding	to	the	
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contradictions	in	the	inclusion‐exclusion	dynamic	in	practice.	For	example,	in	terms	of	policy	
frames	it	is	important	to	acknowledge	that	the	contemporary	exclusion‐inclusion	dynamic	
around	welfare‐to‐work	and	employment	policies	has	a	much	longer	history	in	the	binary	
category	of	‘deserving’	and	‘undeserving	poor’.	Indeed,	worklessness	remains	perhaps	the	most	
powerful	engine	of	social	exclusion,	justifying	the	continual	violence	of	societal	responses	to	an	
attributed	‘intentional	refusal	to	work’,	as	there	are	few	ways	of	causing	more	societal	offence	
than	refusing	the	moral	imperative	to	‘earn	one’s	crust’	(Scanlon	&	Adlam	2011:	246).		And	in	
terms	of	local	service	delivery	in	the	provision	of	employment	assistance,	care	and	other	social	
services	there	is	a	need	to	acknowledge	the	contradictions	within	the	exclusion‐inclusion	
dynamic,	particularly	the	need	to	understand,	or	at	least	respect	the	decisions	of	those	‘that	
refuse	to	come	in	from	the	cold’	and	join	‘mainstream	society’.	As	Scanlon	&	Adlam	(2011:	244)	
argue	in	their	critique	of	the	symbolic	violence	of	a	normative	society:		
We	consider	the	plight	of	the	individual	who	refuses	to	rejoin,	or	indeed	who	may	
never	have	felt	included	in	the	first	place;	and	we	seek	to	understand	this	
problematic	social	refusal	in	the	context	of	failures	of	hospitality	and	citizenship,	
and	the	denying	of	membership	of	the	metropolitan	societal	in‐group	in	relation	
to	which	the	antisocial	individual	must	then	stand	in	opposition.		
The	challenge	is	to	avoid	scapegoating	tendencies	in	how	refusals	to	join	are	framed	and	
understood,	even	when	those	who	express	their	opposition	do	so	in	ways	that	may	be	harmful	
to	themselves	or	others.	What	we	have	tried	to	do	in	this	final	section	is	suggest	some	
alternative	first	principles	for	designing	a	different	institutional	response	to	marginalisation	and	
disadvantage	–	one	that	would	go	beyond	a	simplistic	inclusion‐exclusion	dichotomy	(Nevile	
2006),	implicating	all	citizens	in	the	project	of	creating	a	fairer,	more	genuinely	inclusive	society.		
Conclusion 
This	paper	has	discussed	the	concept	and	practice	of	social	inclusion	policy	in	Australia	from	a	
critical	standpoint	where	substantial	differences	are	seen	to	exist	between	multi‐dimensional	
government	pronouncements	on	social	inclusion‐exclusion	and	a	rather	more	narrow	emphasis	
on	paid	employment	in	major	social	policy	initiatives.	What	we	have	argued	is	that	the	social	
inclusion	policy	agenda	pursued	by	the	previous	ALP	Government	failed	to	escape	the	moral	
imperative	around	paid	employment	enshrined	in	the	institutional	legacy	of	the	exclusionary	
tendencies	within	the	‘male	wage	earner’s	welfare	state’	(Bryson	1992:	89).	As	such	the	policy	
agenda	is	likely	to	have	suffered	from	similar	shortcomings	and	unequal	outcomes,	particularly	
for	women,	Indigenous	Australians,	low‐skilled	workers,	and	the	long‐term	unemployed.	It	is	
too	early	to	tell	whether	the	National	Disability	Insurance	Scheme,	paid	maternity	leave,	and	
school	education	reforms	will	mute	the	productivist	paradigm.	At	this	stage,	our	assessment	is	
that	despite	much	initial	fanfare	about	the	social	inclusion	policy	agenda,	the	policy	frames	and	
reforms	introduced	during	this	period	were	often	a	case	of	old	wine	in	new	bottles.		
In	part,	this	critical	account	highlights	the	importance	of	the	connection	between	politics,	public	
administration,	and	policy	outcomes.	Unlike	the	UK,	Australia	did	not	embed	social	inclusion	
targets	in	all	federal	government	departments	and	the	now	defunct	Social	Inclusion	Board	was	
not	central	to	social	policy	decision	making	(Saunders	2013).	And	despite	some	sophisticated	
developments	in	social	and	economic	indicators	of	disadvantage,	the	social	inclusion	policy	
agenda	did	not	fully	embrace	the	multiple	dimensions	of	exclusion/inclusion	put	forward	by	
researchers.	All	of	this	is	not	to	say	that	the	‘weak’	policy	discourse	of	social	inclusion	could	not	
be	refashioned	into	a	framework	that	has	the	analytical	and	practical	capacity	to	address	the	
structural	inequalities	that	create	and	contribute	to	various	forms	of	social	and	economic	
marginalisation.	First,	we	need	more	public	debate	and	deliberation	about	the	quality	and	depth	
of	inclusion	that	acknowledges	the	harsh	realities	of	the	working	poor	who	‘earn’	their	poverty	
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with	multiple	low‐paid	and	insecure	jobs	(Novak	1997).	In	a	labour	market	with	a	significant	
share	of	casual	and	insecure	work,	it	is	income	that	is	in	fact	the	key	material	measure	of	
inclusion,	not	whether	someone	has	a	paid	job.	However,	even	this	recognition	does	not	get	us	
far	enough	in	acknowledging	the	important	role	that	non‐market	forms	of	inclusion	play	in	
creating	the	conditions	for	security	and	human	flourishing.		
Refurbishing	a	connected	and	embedded	model	of	social	citizenship	and	social	justice	is	a	
worthwhile	aim	as	it	acknowledges	the	dialectical	relationship	between	political	and	social	
rights	(Scott	2006).	Addressing	social	inequality	requires	clarifying	value	debates,	mobilising	
collective	agents,	and	expanding	opportunities	for	voice	in	the	public	polity.	This	in	turn	will	
help	to	define	and	shape	a	form	of	citizenship	that	is	authentically	connected	to	social,	cultural	
and	economic	modes	of	participation,	not	a	model	whereby	people	are	forced	into	being	one‐
dimensional	‘responsibilised	risk	managers’	in	a	narrowly	defined	‘job	holder’	society.	In	
contrast,	the	social	citizenship	and	social	justice	envisaged	here	is,	as	Tilly	(1999:	56)	notes,	
‘thick’	in	terms	of	rights	and	equal	status	–	as	opposed	to	‘thin’	citizenship,	loaded	with	
responsibilities	and	conditional	allowances.		
Constructing	and	implementing	a	vision	for	a	more	inclusive	society	requires	acknowledging	the	
contradictions	of	the	present,	such	as	the	way	in	which	the	welfare	state	is	both	an	enabling	and	
disabling	political‐economic	force	and	the	fact	that	in	cultural	terms	‘included’	groups	have	
always	required	‘excluded’	groups	in	order	to	defend	social	norms	that	preserve	established	
economic	interests.	We	also	need	to	acknowledge	that	conflict,	inequality	and	competition	are	
integral	features	of	capitalist	economies.	These	structural	dynamics	cannot	be	wished	away	by	
weak	social	inclusion	talk	that	both	reflects	and	reinforces	unquestioned	truths.	We	need	policy	
metaphors	and	research	that	is	able	to	sharpen,	rather	than	blunt	social	realities	in	order	to	
transcend	the	present	and	envision	what	Erik	Olin	Wright	(2010)	calls	‘real	utopias’,	which	
means	not	only	articulating	the	architecture	of	a	fairer	future,	but	also	developing	a	more	fully	
fledged	social	diagnosis	of	problems	in	the	present.	
Notes 
	
1	Rhetorical	claims	about	passive	welfare	have	been	greatly	exaggerated;	given	that	the	receipt	of	
benefits	in	countries	with	highly	‘targeted’	income	support	policies	have	always	had	an	element	of	
conditionality	(Marston,	2008).	What	has	changed	in	the	past	two	decades,	in	Australia	and	the	UK,	is	
the	linking	of	conditionality	to	broadly	defined	‘activities’,	rather	than	to	a	specific	work	test.	
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